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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 275 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 17/02/2000 
Where it occurred: Ploughshare minefield, 
Mozambique border 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: Mounser/various 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 




No accident report was made available by the programme manager in January 2001. The 
demining group manager did provide a spreadsheet recording accident data on which this 
accident was recorded. Documents of any kind were only provided after pressure had been 
applied through the funder. To try to counter any omissions in the reports provided, 
statements were taken from a field supervisor in March 2001. The following summarises the 
content of the spreadsheet and includes detail from statements. 
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in one-man teams using a one-
man drill [from the start of 2000 this drill was adopted]. In this a single deminer looks for 
tripwires, cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates finds. The group issued frontal 
protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while excavating. 
The accident occurred 50cm from the site of the accident that occurred on 15th February 
2000 involving the same group. This was only two days after that accident, from which it is 
inferred that the area-reduction by Survey was continuing. 
The area immediately around the site of the former accident had been swept by senior staff 
and the independent QA staff. They had searched over the mine involved in this accident and 
not located it. They concluded that the mine was not detectable with the detectors in use 
(Vallon and Guartel MD8). 
The victim was continuing the breach begun by the earlier victim. He worked a further ten 
metres and checked the lane with his detector as he walked back towards the safe area. As 
he passed the site of the earlier accident, he got a slight detector reading and began to 
investigate with his prod. The mine detonated. 
The site supervisor determined that the mine had been on its side and he had prodded 
directly onto it. This was decided because the crater showed “funnelling”. The victim 
sustained minor injuries to his hand and a cut to his nose. His prodder was thrown back and 




Victim number: 350 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 











A brief medical report was obtained from another source. The victim was named in the 
medical report. 
The victim was recorded as suffering “Neck bruises and swelling (haematoma), mild 
neurogenic [Sp?] shock”. 
The victim’s field treatment was: 
“Fluid replacement, ATT [illegible]; 
Patient reassurance; 
Off duty 2 weeks – got home; 
Patient managed at field.” 
Procedures were recorded as: “Pressure bandages and cleaning of bruises”. 
The victim was “reassured but discharged from project on his own voluntary effort” 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management Control inadequacy” because 
the preliminary survey of local people indicated that the area was mined. The Survey team 
then went in mine-hunting without using clearance drills or marking systems. This was an 
inappropriate method of “reducing” the suspect area by “Survey” and implies inadequate 
training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”  
The failure of the management group to provide details of the accident may be seen as 
implying that they wished to play down its significance or conceal the fact that it occurred so 
close to the previous accident. If the earlier accident investigation was made as recorded, the 
mine was missed by all the investigators – which could indicate that either the clearance 
method was inappropriate of the investigators were incompetent. 
The victim’s facial injury was unexplained, and may indicate that his visor was worn raised or 
not worn.  
The victim was using a purpose designed demining handtool that stayed in one piece during 
the accident. Although it struck him in a vulnerable area, it did not cause significant injury. 
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was incomplete and had been 
edited prior to being made available. 
 
 
3 
